2 physico-mechanicae). The actions of a human being, as the actions of an intelligent being, are determined rather by inner grounds (per rationes internas) namely by motives of the understanding (per motiva intellectus) (AA 01:400-1).
We can see more clearly that this is a version of the Leibnizian equation of freedom with rational spontaneity when we note that according to the Wolffian psychology underlying Kant's view, these motives (motiva or Bewegungsgründe) are the representations of the good and the bad that serve as the ground or reason (Grund) why we will something. 4 For Wolff, a
person cannot choose what he represents as worse over what he represents as better; motives thus "confer certainty"; and yet this is compatible with freedom since, the person could choose the worse if he wished, that is, if he were to represent it as better (German Metaphysics § §521, 517). Wolff concludes from this that the free will is self-determining (German Metaphysics § §518-519, 515).
5
Kant, of course, subsequently rejects the Leibnizian account of freedom as a mere "freedom of a turnspit" ("Freiheit eines Bratenwenders") (KpV, AA 05: 97): the claim that actions are free simply because they arise from motives of the understanding-because they are actions "whose natural determining ground lies internally in the acting being" ("davon der bestimmende Naturgrund innerlich im wirkenden Wesen liegt")-is therefore merely a "wretched subterfuge" ("ein elender Behelf") (95.29-96.08 ). In making these claims, Kant sides with the libertarianism advocated by Crusius against the compatibilism of Leibniz and
Wolff. 6 However, in notes and lectures throughout his career, Kant continues to define the free will in the Leibnizian terms familiar from the Nova dilucidatio: the free will is the will determined by motives (motiva/Bewegunsgründe) rather than stimuli or sensible impulses (stimuli/Antriebe). For example, in the early 1780s Kant defines the arbitrium liberum as the Kant. Cambridge. 1990, 331-350. will "that is determined by motives" ("das durch motiva determiniert wird") (V-MP/Mron, AA Leipzig. 1750, §1 (cited henceforth cited as Diss. de appetitibus).
(German Ethics § §8-23). Alternatively, if we are not "reasonable human beings" we must be given a motive to act morally by political authority in the form of rewards and punishments that make our more immediate welfare conditional upon compliance with the "law of nature"
(German Ethics §8, 39).
Rejecting this intellectualization of morality, Crusius, claims that the ordinary human understanding already possesses the motive to conform to the divine moral law in the form of the innate "drive of conscience" (Gewissenstrieb). But Crusius has difficulty explaining why we ought to act according to this motive among others we also possess: he claims that we ought to choose in accordance with the objectively best motive (Anweisung §52 are simultaneously motives or principles of our own will and if, in particular, the moral law is a law of our own will, the relation of the will to the moral law is instead one of autonomy.
Despite this important difference from Crusius, Kant nevertheless follows Crusius rather than Leibniz to the extent that he holds that there is a gap between motives and the subjective moving force that actually brings about an action. And this requires an important terminological deviation from Baumgarten. Baumgarten considers both motives and stimuli to be incentives (Triebfeder, elateres animi) that actually cause actions: motives are intellectual incentives and stimuli are sensible incentives (Metaphysica § §663, 669, 670, 677) . But beginning around the 1770s, Kant denies that motives are just a species of incentive; he instead distinguishes the objective necessitation of motives from the subjective moving power of incentives. In his transitional ethics lectures from the 1770s, Kant characterizes motives (Bewegungsgründe) as motiva objective moventia, whereas the incentives (Triebfeder/elateres) that actually move the will are characterized as motiva subjective moventia. To be necessitated subjectively would be pathological necessitation by stimuli, and in that case the will would not be free. Motives, by contrast, necessitate the will objectively or "practically". On this view, the moral motive of the understanding does not subjectively determine the will since the understanding provides merely a principle of appraisal (diiudication) of obligation "according to which I judge the goodness and depravity of actions" ("nach welchem ich die Bonitaet und privitaet der Handlungen beurtheile"), not a principle of performance (execution), i.e., a principle of incentive (Triebfeder), which instead comes from a moral feeling (moralisches Gefühl) (V-Mo/Collins, AA 27:274f.). It is in the context of this gap between the objective moving power of motives and the subjective power of incentives to actually bring about an action that we should understand Kant's more wellknown distinction in the Groundwork between incentives (Triebfeder) and motives (Bewegungsgründe). On this view, motives are objective rather than subjective because they hold for every rational being ("für jedes vernünftiges Wesen gelten") cf. KpV, . That is, the incentive/motive contrast is between representations with subjective and (merely) objective moving force, not between empirical and a priori representations. This is consistent with the development of these terms from Baumgarten and also makes the best sense of the fact that both before and after the Groundwork Kant speaks of the non-empirical incentive of a morally good action (e.g., V- The same contrast between pathological necessitation by stimuli and practical necessitation by motives or imperatives is asserted in the Canon of the first Critique, where we are told that the free will is "independent of sensible stimuli" ("unabhängig von sinnlichen Antrieben"), and that the human being instead has reason, which gives laws "that are imperatives, i. arises not from a failure of the intellect, but rather from the "depravity of the heart" ("Pravitaet des Herzens") (as Kant suggests in the transitional ethics lectures) or a "perversity of the heart" ("Verkehrtheit des Herzens") (Religion 6:37), that is, from a practical failure of our will.
In the Nova dilucidatio, Kant had claimed that if freedom were a power to act without or even contrary to the representation of the best, then freedom would be mere chance, which is no better than fate (AA 01: 402 It is in this context that we can explain the fact-otherwise surprising given his stance against Leibnizian intellectualism-that Kant says he endorses the "old formula of the schools: "nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, nisi sub ratione mali" (KpV, AA 05:59.12-14), i.e., we desire nothing except under the aspect of the good, and we avoid nothing except under the aspect of the bad. By endorsing the "old formula of the schools", Kant shows his debt to the moral psychology of Leibniz and the Wolffians rather than any direct debt to Aquinas or Scotus: At one point, Leibniz alerts us to the "most ancient and universal dogma": "Voluntatis objectum esse bonum apparens, et nihil a nobis appeti nisi sub ratione boni apparentis" (Ak. IV 6:1380), that the object of the will is the apparent good, and that we desire nothing except under the aspect of the apparent good. Kant is almost certainly unaware of Leibniz's invocation of this "ancient dogma". But it is curiously similar to a Wolff's "lex appetitus" or law of the faculty of desire: "But it nevertheless remains true what the ancients pointed out long ago: that we will nothing except what we take to be good, and will against nothing except what we take to be bad. representations of good and bad, or else they are pleasure, displeasure, and affects-i.e., indistinct representations of good and bad" (German Metaphysics §506).
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Kant's mature account of practical freedom aims to be in conformity with the "old formula of the schools" and thus with Wolff's lex appetitus. We have already seen how Kant's account of freedom as necessitation by motives or imperatives can be understood in this context: the free will is necessitated by motives representing the good. However, the free will is thereby only "practically" or "objectively" necessitated, and hence actions do not follow from motives with certainty as they do on the Leibnizian picture. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in more detail Kant's account of freedom as a causality according to imperatives. But one potential problem with this account is directly relevant to the issues under consideration: if the representation of the good necessitating a free action expresses merely what we ought to do, then it seems that the choice whether to follow this imperative would itself be unintelligent: either merely arbitrary or merely natural. Kant has at least two ways to address this problem and thus make his account consistent with the "old formula of the schools". First, we all possess the "moral motive" or objective conception of the good against which we assess our maxims; and this means that although morally bad action is a practical failure, it is also a failure of reason to derive actions from the laws that we represent to ourselves as universally valid (GMS, ). This can be contrasted with
Crusius's view, according to which our evil is a failure of will to act according to the Wolff's account of the role of maxims in action serves an intellectualist view of action: moral improvement of the will consists in increasing the distinctness of the cognitions of good and bad embodied in our maxims. The will itself, for its part, always follows the understanding and its maxims (German Ethics §400). Wolff says quite explicitly here:
"Acquiring different maxims for judging good and bad, as well as attaining different concepts of things, belongs, without a single exception, to the understanding" . In addition, the will can be improved by correcting the concepts used to distinguish cases as falling under the maxim (ibid. what we take, in a maxim, to be good. Accounting for this possibility-that maxims can be the product of an absolute freedom-becomes a task central to Kant's mature practical philosophy and thus to his philosophy in general.
Despite these important deviations from the Leibnizian view, the critical Kant still holds to a version of the view that he asserted in the Nova dilucidatio of 1755: that we are free in choosing what we take to be good, and thus free even when we pursue evil. Kant's account of the relationship between the moral law and the will's freedom from the causal necessity of nature is intended to solve two related problems that Kant claims his predecessors failed to solve: (1) the problem of how we are free causes of our actions in the natural world and (2) the problem of how we are motivated to act morally. In articulating positions on these issues, Kant breaks completely with his Leibnizian past. But this innovation occurs within the context of a conception of moral psychology that remains deeply indebted to Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. Indeed, in terms of the account of the operation of our practical mental capacities and our "practical freedom", Kant's account of the freedom that ensures our moral responsibility turns out to be a revision of Leibniz's account of the freedom of the will that is "inclined" but not "necessitated" by the reasons of the understanding, the freedom to choose what we take to be good.
